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We study the effects of securitization on renegotiation of distressed residential mortgages over the current financial 
crisis. Unlike prior studies, we employ unique data that directly observe lender renegotiation actions and cover more 
than 60% of the U.S. mortgage market. Exploiting within-servicer variation in these data, we find that bank-held 
loans are 26% to 36% more likely to be renegotiated than comparable securitized mortgages (4.2 to 5.7% in absolute 
terms). Also, modifications of bank-held loans are more efficient: conditional on a modification, bank-held loans 
have lower post-modification default rates by 9% (3.5% in absolute terms). Our findings support the view that 
frictions introduced by securitization create a significant challenge to effective renegotiation of residential loans.  
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1.   Introduction 
With the recent boom and bust of the housing market and the subsequent financial crisis, 
mortgage delinquency rates and consequent foreclosures have reached unprecedented levels 
(Mayer, Pence, and Sherlund, 2009; Mayer, 2010). The wave of foreclosures triggered an active 
debate among policymakers and academics about whether securitization impeded alternative loss 
mitigation practices such as renegotiation of distressed loans, thereby aggravating the housing 
crisis (e.g., Adelino, Gerardi, and Willen, 2009a, 2009b, and Foote, Gerardi, Goette, and Willen, 
2009, vs. Piskorski, Seru, and Vig, 2010, Posner and Zingales, 2009, and Mayer, 2010). The 
debate stems in part from the absence of direct data on renegotiations. The earlier studies 
approached this question indirectly, either by studying outcomes such as  foreclosure rates 
(Piskorski et al., 2010) or by using heuristic algorithms to identify renegotiation (Adelino et al., 
2009a, 2009b; Foote et al., 2009). 
In contrast, our paper uses direct and precise data on renegotiation actions of lenders and, 
therefore, has the potential to clarify this issue and settle the debate. We find that distressed 
securitized loans are significantly less likely to be renegotiated (up to 36% in relative terms) than 
similar  bank-held  loans.  Moreover, modifications of bank-held loans are more efficient  --
conditional on a modification, bank-held loans have lower post-modification default rates (by 
9% in relative terms). Our results are consistent with the findings in Piskorski et al. (2010) and 
inconsistent with the results of Adelino et al. (2009a; 2009b) and Foote et al. (2009). Further, our 
study provides precise estimates on intensity and efficiency of mortgage renegotiations over a 
period when lenders and investors were free to pursue their own approaches. 2 
 
We use a unique and detailed dataset known as the OCC-OTS Mortgage Metrics that 
contains precise loss mitigation and performance outcomes for about 64% of U.S. mortgages.
1
The thrust of our study is the evaluation of the choice between different loss mitigation 
practices. We classify resolution practices into four main categories: liquidation, modification, 
repayment plans, and refinancing. Liquidation includes foreclosure, deed-in-lieu, and short sales. 
In modifications, mortgage terms are altered. Modification programs sometimes begin with a 
trial period of a few months, at the end of which, conditional on success, modification becomes 
permanent. Modifications could result in lenders altering the mortgage interest rate, balance, 
and/or term. Repayment plans are short-term programs that allow borrowers to repay late 
mortgage payments, typically, over a six- to twelve-month period. Refinancing occurs when a 
 
We primarily focus on loss mitigation resolutions that took place for mortgages that became “in 
trouble” (seriously delinquent or entered loss mitigation programs) in 2008, a period in which 
there was virtually no government intervention in the private mortgage market. We track loans 
until May 2009 to examine the loss mitigation resolution. The dataset is a loan-level panel 
comprised of monthly servicer reports of the payment history, as well as detailed information 
about loss mitigation actions taken for each distressed mortgage. By way of example, for a 
delinquent loan undergoing modification, the dataset reports specific changes in original loan 
terms, reduction in interest rate, amount of principal deferred or forgiven, extension of the 
repayment period, etc. To our knowledge, this is the only comprehensive data source on loss 
mitigation efforts and mortgage performance. 
                                                           
1 As discussed in Section 2, our data are more detailed than have been used in the literature so far. Moreover, the 
dataset is comprehensive and comparable to previous studies, as is explained in the validity tests in the Appendix, 
where we compare some basic regressions estimated in previous studies (e.g., Piskorski et al., 2010) and our data. 3 
 
new loan is issued in place of the existing one.
2
As a preliminary analysis, we analyze the distribution of mitigation  outcomes  for 
mortgages that became seriously delinquent. We find that within six months after becoming 
seriously delinquent, about 31%  of  the troubled loans  that enter our sample  in 2008 are in 
liquidation  (either voluntary or through foreclosure),  10.0% are modified, 2.6%  enter a 
repayment plan, and 2.4% get refinanced (Table 2, Panel A). The rest (about 54%) have no 
recorded action. A year following delinquency, about half of borrowers are in liquidation, about 
23% of loans have been renegotiated, and about 25% had no action. While the absolute levels of 
renegotiation rates may seem low, one needs to remember that there is no theoretical benchmark 
on the optimal number of loan renegotiations. In the absence of such a benchmark, it is hard to 
comment on whether the observed levels of renegotiations are too high or too low. 
 While liquidation implies that the borrower loses 
the house, the three other renegotiation categories imply that the borrower can stay in the house. 
In our main analysis, we explore the effect of securitization on the likelihood of loans to 
be  renegotiated, or more specifically—modified. This topic was the  focus of a policy and 
academic debate,
3
                                                           
2 Among wide-scale government initiatives, the Home Affordable Refinance Program (HARP) initiated in March 
2009 offers refinancing of loans owned or guaranteed by the Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. The program is limited to 
performing loans with high loan-to-value (LTV) ratios (up to 125%). More information is available at 
 and was empirically tested in some earlier papers. Piskorski et al. (2010) show 
http://makinghomeaffordable.gov/refinance_eligibility.html. 
3 Stegman, Quercia, Ratcliffe, Ding, and Davis (2007) and Gelpern and Levitin (2009) argue that securitization 
contracts are written in a way that does not allow easy modification. Stegman et al. (2007) also find large variation 
in servicer ability to cure delinquencies, implying that poor servicing quality translated into higher default rates. The 
theme of conflicting servicer and investor incentives is echoed in Eggert (2007) and Goodman (2009). Magder 
(2009) goes farthest in claiming that these conflicts of interest are the reason for low modification rates. 4 
 
that the foreclosure rate of portfolio-owned delinquent loans is 3% to 7% lower in absolute terms 
than that of comparable loans that are securitized (13% to 32% in relative terms). Further, they 
find that around the early pay default date, the foreclosure rate is lower for securitized loans that 
are repurchased by lenders than for securitized loans that remain with the lenders. They argue 
that  the higher rate of foreclosure among securitized loans is evidence of  securitization 
hampering renegotiation. Adelino et al. (2009a; 2009b) and Foote et al. (2009) also examine the 
question by algorithmically flagging loans that had interest rate reductions, term extensions, or 
loan balance changes as modifications. The algorithm was tested on mortgage data of Wells 
Fargo, where the authors documented approximately 15% false positive and 15% false negative 
outcomes. Using their modification flag, the authors find that private level securitized loans were 
not any less likely to be modified.   
Our unique data allow us to observe renegotiation actions (modification, refinance, and 
repayment) directly, and therefore we can evaluate  the  rates  of loan renegotiation and 
modification  without any error.  We find that the rate of renegotiation within six months of 
delinquency is 4.2 to 5.7 percentage points (26% to 36% in relative terms) higher for portfolio 
loans. We document that the rate of loan modification, which constitutes the lion’s share (over 
75%)  of  private  renegotiation actions, is also  significantly  higher  for  portfolio  loans. 
Specifically, portfolio-held loans are 4.2 to 5.8 percentage points (34% to 51% in relative terms) 
more likely to be modified. For refinancing and repayment plans, we find no consistent effect of 
securitization. Overall, our evidence is consistent with the argument of Piskorski et al. (2010) 
and with their estimates of the effect of securitization that suggest a 30% greater likelihood of 
liquidation for securitized mortgages than for mortgages held on servicers’ books. 5 
 
The results are robust across multiple specifications. In particular, our tests use a battery 
of controls for mortgage characteristics, credit quality, leverage, origination year, and zip code 
interacted with calendar quarter. Furthermore, we show that the results remain similar even when 
controlling for servicer fixed effects. The inclusion of these controls exploits within-servicer 
variation  in renegotiation choices and suggests that capacity constraints cannot account for 
observed differences in portfolio and securitized loan outcomes. In addition, we find very similar  
results when we alter the length of the time horizon over which renegotiations are evaluated (9 
and 12 months) or split our sample into two equal periods (2008/Q1-Q2 vs. 2008/Q3-Q4).  
The results also hold for subsamples: (i) excluding mortgages that are guaranteed by 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (collectively known as the government-sponsored enterprises or 
GSEs)  since, relative to privately securitized loans, GSE loans are originated with stricter 
underwriting standards, carry no default risk for investors, and face different servicer incentives 
during renegotiations (see Levitin and Twomey, 2011), and (ii) for mortgages stratified on ex 
ante loan quality  characteristics to account for unobservable heterogeneity.  Importantly, our 
results are similar in magnitude for loans of high quality (FICO score above 680 and full 
documentation), where information asymmetries between originators and investors are 
minimized (Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig,  2009). This suggests  that  our tests capture 
renegotiation impediments due to securitization, rather than unobserved loan quality associated 
with the likelihood of securitization. 
Next, we analyze the effects of securitization on renegotiation terms. We find that 
although portfolio-held loans are more likely to be modified, the modification terms do not differ 
dramatically among portfolio and securitized loans, with the exception of principal deferrals that 6 
 
are exclusively done on portfolio loans and some actions, such as interest rate reductions, that 
appear less concessionary for portfolio loans. 
Having direct data on renegotiations also allows us to examine the efficiency of 
modifications across securitized and bank-held loans without any classification error. We do so 
by assessing post-modification redefault across the two sets of loans. We show that within six 
months of modification, redefault rates are 3.5 percentage points lower for portfolio-held loans 
than for private-label securitizations (about 9% in relative terms). These findings suggest that 
servicers renegotiate mortgages that they own more efficiently than mortgages that are 
securitized. 
Finally,  we  document that affordability is a primary cause of redefault.  We report a 
strong relationship between modification terms and  subsequent probability of redefault. 
Specifically, greater reductions in loan interest rates (or monthly payments) are associated with 
sizable declines in redefault rates. As an illustration, reducing the monthly payment by 10% is 
associated with a  4.3  percentage  point  drop in the  six-month  redefault rate  (the  base rate 
redefault rate is 49%). This result supports the underlying assumption of the federal Home Loan 
Affordable Modification relief program (HAMP) that enhancing mortgage affordability reduces 
redefaults. 
Overall, we believe that our results resolve the debate in the literature about the role of 
securitization in mortgage renegotiations. We show that  securitization  impedes mortgage 
renegotiations.  Conditional on renegotiation, we document that portfolio-held loans are 
renegotiated more efficiently; their redefault rate is lower. Importantly, our results also provide 
out-of-sample evidence about the role of securitization in renegotiation beyond Piskorski et al. 
(2010), as we examine a later sample period than they do. 7 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data source and the 
organization of the database. Section 3 analyzes loss mitigation and renegotiation practices with 
respect to securitization status. Section 4 analyzes the effects of loan modification terms on 
redefault, and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.   Data 
2.1.   Data Sources 
For this paper, we use a unique dataset known as the OCC/OTS Mortgage Metrics. This 
dataset includes detailed origination and servicing information for large U.S. mortgage servicers 
owned by 10 of the largest banks supervised by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(OCC), as well as large thrifts overseen by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS). The data 
consist of monthly observations of over 34 million mortgages totaling $6 trillion, which make up 
about 64% of U.S. residential mortgages. The data allow us to differentiate among 19 servicing 
entities owned by 10 large banks, each of which maintains effective autonomy in making loss 
mitigation decisions, regardless of its  ultimate corporate ownership. The  performance  data 
available to us span from October 2007 to May 2009. There is no restriction on origination date. 
Many origination details in the dataset are similar to those found in other loan-level data 
(e.g., First CoreLogic LoanPerformance or LPS data). The servicing information is collected 
monthly and includes details about actual payments, loan status, and changes in loan terms. 
Critically, the dataset also contains detailed information about the  workout resolution for 
borrowers that are in trouble. For modifications, the data contain information about the modified 
terms and subsequent repayment behavior. The ability to observe loan status on a monthly basis 
also allows us to evaluate post-modification mortgage performance. 8 
 
It should be noted, however, that the Mortgage Metrics dataset has certain limitations. 
For instance, it lacks information on combined loan-to-value ratios (CLTV), making it difficult 
to accurately estimate distressed borrowers’ equity position. The data are not linked to outside 
sources on the rest of borrowers’ debt obligations, which masks their true financial condition at 
the time of delinquency. Furthermore, certain data fields (e.g., self-reported reasons for default) 
are reported by only a subset of servicers and even then the coverage is sporadic.  Yet, on 
balance, the detail and precision of information on loss mitigation practices make this dataset 
unique, potentially leading to a better understanding of an important policy question.  
 
2.2.  Identifying “In Trouble” Mortgages 
When analyzing the transaction data, we focus on troubled mortgages. The original OCC-
OTS dataset is an unbalanced panel, containing information on 34 million mortgages per month. 
We transform this dataset into a cross-section of mortgages in two steps. First, we extract the 
subsample of loans that become troubled at any point during the period of January 2008 until 
May 2009. (For most of the regression analysis, we use only the subsample of loans that became 
“in trouble” in 2008.) Troubled mortgages are mortgages that became 60+ days past due or 
voluntarily entered the loss mitigation program. To ensure that our analysis correctly captures the 
timing of loss mitigation actions, we require all mortgages in our universe to be current in the 
last quarter of 2007. After removing second lien mortgages, as well as mortgages insured by the 
Federal Housing Administration (FHA),  U.S. Department of Veterans  Affairs (VA),  or 
Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA), we identify about 1.58 million individual 
first-lien mortgages that become troubled at some point during our sample period.  9 
 
Next, we summarize the important outcomes, event dates, and characteristics of each 
troubled mortgage and its borrower. Finally, we collapse the panel data into a cross-sectional 
dataset. For example, each mortgage record includes its borrower and loan characteristics at the 
time of origination,  the date on  which it became “in trouble,”  updated  borrower and loan 
characteristics when it became “in trouble,” the first workout resolution pursued by the servicer, 
and the date of that action, etc. 
Table 1 presents summary statistics of our sample. Panel A shows that the flow of “in 
trouble” loans is more or less stable over the sample period. Panel B provides a broad summary 
of the sample, highlighting borrower and loan characteristics at different points in time. The 
average FICO score of troubled borrowers drops by 60 points between origination and the time 
of entry into the sample, indicating considerable financial stress. The loan-to-value (LTV) ratios 
tell a similar story of deteriorating financial position, although the averages mask considerable 
variation in home equity positions. In particular, a substantial fraction of mortgages originated 
during the boom years (2004-07) enter the sample with negative home equity, while many of the 
longer held mortgages have fairly low LTV values. The distribution of LTV values further 
suggests that a majority of troubled borrowers have at least some positive equity stake in their 
homes. Finally, as mentioned earlier, these figures under-represent total leverage because they 
often fail to capture second-lien loans taken on the same property.  
The sample represents all major investor/lender categories, as about one-third of the loans 
are securitized by the GSEs and slightly more than one-quarter are securitized through private-
label  mortgage backed securities (MBSs).  The rest are held in portfolio, i.e.,  owned by the 
servicing bank. As would be expected for a sample of distressed loans, our sample contains a 10 
 
disproportionate number of investor properties and loans underwritten with less than full 
documentation. 
 
2.3.  Validation of Sample 
We verify the validity of our sample by rerunning specifications that are close to those 
used in the previous literature. Like the Piskorski et al. (2010) sample, loans that we study were 
originated in the years leading to the crisis. First, we run regressions akin to their Table 3 
foreclosure/liquidation  regressions.  These logit regressions explore the determinants of 
liquidation within six months of delinquency. We present our results alongside theirs in the 
Appendix. The main variable of interest (the indicator variable for being a portfolio loan) has a 
similar magnitude: portfolio loans are 10.2 percentage points less likely to be liquidated in our 
sample  (Column (2)), compared  with  5.4  percentage points in their sample (Column (1)). 
Second, we run a regression that is similar in spirit to the Piskorski et al. Table 7A regression on 
cure rates. In our sample portfolio, loans are more likely to be renegotiated by 4.7% (Column 
(5)), while they document that portfolio loans “cure” at a rate 6.1% higher in absolute terms than 
similar loans that are securitized.
4
 
 In sum, we conclude that our sample has similar properties to 
those used in previous related studies. 
                                                           
4 Note that our measure of renegotiations is more accurate than the indirect measure of renegotiation (cure rates) 
used by Piskorski et al. (2010). Nevertheless, the results are quite similar and suggest that a higher cure rate of 
portfolio loans documented in earlier work could be explained in part by their higher renegotiation rate. 11 
 
3.   Loss Mitigation and Renegotiation Practices and the Role of Securitization 
3.1.  Description of Loss Mitigation and Renegotiation Practices 
Loss mitigation resolutions include four major types of actions that lenders and servicers 
typically take.
5
The first class of interventions is liquidation. This includes loans that have been 
liquidated through a deed-in-lieu or short sale and completed foreclosures, as well as loans that 
are in the process of being liquidated through legal foreclosure proceedings. Deed-in-lieu is the 
process in which the borrower transfers the property interest to the lender, and thus avoids the 
legal process of forced foreclosure through the courts. In a short sale, the lender and borrower 
agree to sell the property (typically at a loss) and transfer the proceeds to the lender who then 
writes off the balance of the mortgage loan. Completed foreclosures include post-foreclosure sale 
and  real estate owned (REO) properties.  Distressed mortgages that are still in  foreclosure 
proceedings are those  for which the  lender  is  in the process of pursuing  its interest in the 
property through the courts. 
  The  loss mitigation process begins when a  borrower  becomes  seriously 
delinquent (typically 60+  days past-due  (dpd)) or when a  borrower voluntarily contacts the 
lender and requests to renegotiate the loan. Both of these types of borrowers are considered 
“troubled” in our analysis. Figure 1 illustrates the different potential workout paths. 
The second loss mitigation practice is loan modification, which attracted considerable 
publicity in discussions leading up to the eventual implementation of  HAMP and in its 
aftermath.
6
                                                           
5 Brikmann (2008) and Crews-Cutts and Merrill (2008) provide an overview of the different types of interventions. 
 The distinguishing feature of loan modifications is the amendment of the original 
6  Several recent studies provide a historical perspective on  government involvement in home mortgage loss 
mitigation programs. Rose (2010) discusses the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC) program, which bought 12 
 
mortgage terms. The usual process has the lender independently offering the borrower a new set 
of loan terms or offering to negotiate new terms with them. This process can be quite lengthy as 
it requires collection of relevant documentary evidence and subsequent negotiations. 
Modification may also proceed in stages, with a borrower first committing to a trial offer for a 
certain period. Conditional on being able to fulfill the terms of a trial contract, the modification 
offer can be made permanent.  
The  next  type of loss mitigation identified in the data is repayment plans. Under a 
repayment plan, delinquent borrowers commit to paying back the missing payments over several 
months (typically 3 to 6 months). Once the arrears are paid off, the lender reinstates  the 
borrower’s  status as current. In this type of intervention, the terms of the original loan are 
maintained. 
The final resolution type is refinancing. Refinancing of distressed loans is similar to a 
usual refinancing, but may need to be done on the basis of more forgiving underwriting criteria, 
such as higher-than-typical LTV ratios.
7
                                                                                                                                                                                           
delinquent loans from lenders in an attempt to stimulate the real estate market. He finds that the HOLC paid high 
prices for delinquent loans and, thus, primarily benefited lenders rather than borrowers. Ghent (2010) specifically 
studies loan modifications during the Great Depression and finds them to have been very rare. Both of these studies 
are disadvantaged by the poor quality of the data available to study this question. Their applicability to current 
events is further limited by vast institutional differences in residential mortgage markets that occurred over the 
intervening period. 
  In principle, refinancing is similar to a loan 
modification, as it effectively replaces an existing contract with a new one. However, it may 
allow the lender greater flexibility in selling off the loan. 
7 See Hubbard and Mayer’s (2010) suggestion to relax the leverage standards of refinance programs in order to 
allow homeowners to refinance, despite the fact that they are currently underwater. 13 
 
 
3.2.  Breakdown of Loss Mitigation Resolutions across Mortgage Types 
We begin the empirical analysis by examining the renegotiation and liquidation rates 
across mortgage types and time horizons. Table 2 presents summary statistics about resolution 
types offered to mortgages by time elapsed since they became “in trouble.” Panel A shows 
statistics for the entire sample and for GSE loans. Panel B presents statistics for portfolio loans 
and for private-label securitizations.  
A  few interesting facts  appear in the table. First, the most common loss mitigation 
resolution practice in 2008 was liquidation: within six months of delinquency, 31.3% of the 
delinquent loans are liquidated. Within 12 months of delinquency, over half of the troubled loans 
are liquidated. Liquidation rates are materially lower for GSE loans (about 37%) and highest for 
portfolio-held and private-label securitized loans (about 56%). Within a year, over two-thirds of 
the GSE loans that are in the liquidation process have been liquidated, with one-third remaining 
at some intermediate stage in the foreclosure process. The numbers are reversed for portfolio and 
securitized loans: there, about 60% of the loans remain in the foreclosure process, while only 
40% have completed the liquidation. 
Second, renegotiations take place in about 15% of all cases within six months and in 
about 23% of delinquent loans within 12 months. These figures are consistent with the low 
renegotiation rates found in previous studies (e.g., Brikmann, 2008; OCC-OTS quarterly reports 
2010). Interestingly, it appears that portfolio loans have especially high rates of renegotiation 
within short windows. One possibility is that the direct ownership of these loans by servicers 
means they can make quick decisions with respect to renegotiations. For example, within three 
months of delinquency, renegotiation rates for portfolio-held loans are 12%, while the rates for 14 
 
GSE loans and for private-label securitized loans are 7% and 9%, respectively. Within a year of 
delinquency, the trends reverse: GSE loans and private-label securitizations are more likely to be 
unconditionally  renegotiated (24% each) than portfolio-held loans (22%). Across all 
renegotiations, modifications take the lion’s share, accounting for 64% of the total and over 75% 
of all renegotiations of portfolio loans and private-label securitizations. Repayment plans and 
refinancing make up equal shares of about 17% each of all renegotiations, although their rates 
are higher for GSE loans. 
Third, we note that a large fraction of loans receive no recorded action from servicers. 
Within six months, about 54% of loans are not assigned to a loss mitigation path. Within 12 
months of delinquency, this figure declines to 25% of troubled mortgages. Interestingly, the rate 
of “no action” is the highest for GSE loans (37%) and lowest for portfolio-held and securitized 
loans (22% and 20%, respectively). 
 
3.3.  The Role of Securitization 
An important debate taking place in both academic and policy circles focuses on whether 
securitization affects resolution outcomes of delinquent loans. Piskorski et al. (2010) hypothesize 
that agency conflicts between servicers and investors could be  an important determinant of 
whether delinquent loans are liquidated or renegotiated. They find that securitized loans are more 
likely to be foreclosed upon and deduce that renegotiation rates are lower for these mortgages. 
Adelino et al. (2009a; 2009b) and Foote et al. (2009) use an algorithm to identify renegotiations. 
Based on their algorithm—which the authors document has approximately 15% false positive 
and 15% false negative outcomes—they find no material difference in the rate of renegotiation 
between portfolio-held and securitized loans and conclude that securitization does not impede 15 
 
renegotiations. We provide a direct test of the proposition that renegotiation rates of securitized 
mortgages are lower, as our data enable us to identify modification directly from the servicers’ 
reports, rather than inferring it from the prevalence of foreclosure resolutions or imputing it 
using a heuristic assumption based on possible changes in contract terms. 
Our main results are presented in Table 3. In this analysis, we estimate a simple OLS 
specification for each renegotiation outcome separately.
8  These regressions control for 
observable mortgage characteristics. In each specification, the latest FICO and latest LTV scores 
are discretized into buckets to allow greater flexibility in estimation.
9 We also include year of 
origination dummies
10
In Panel A, we regress a renegotiation type dummy on an indicator of whether the loan is 
held by the bank (portfolio-held), in addition to controls and fixed effects. First, we explore the 
determinants of all renegotiations that take place within six months of entering the “in trouble” 
 and interactions of zip code and calendar quarter fixed effects. In some 
specifications we include servicer fixed effects, in order to highlight within-servicer variation. 
                                                           
8 In an unreported robustness test, we rerun the analysis with probit regressions. Table 3 reports OLS estimates that 
are arguably more consistent in specifications with a large number of fixed effects. The probit estimates are 
qualitatively similar and are available upon request. 
9 The FICO buckets are: (1) 300-499, (2) 500-524, (3) 525-549, (4) 550-569, (5) 570-599, (6) 600-629, (7) 630-659, 
(8) 660-699, (9) 700-749, and (10) 750-800. The LTV buckets are: (1) <60%, (2) 60% to <70%, (3) 70% to <75%, 
(4) 75% to <80%, (5) 80% to <85%, (6) 85% to <90%, (7) 90% to <95%, (8) 95% to <100%, (9) 100% to <110%, 
and (10) 110%+. 
10 The origination year dummies are: (1) before 2002, (2) 2002, (3) 2003, (4) 2004, (5) 2005, (6) 2006, (7) 2007, (8) 




We then conduct our analysis after removing all GSE loans from the sample. This is an 
important step since, relative to privately securitized loans, GSE loans are originated with stricter 
underwriting standards, carry no default risk for investors, and face different servicer incentives 
during renegotiations (see Levitin and Twomey, 2011). Further, this sample restriction facilitates 
comparison with existing studies, as it conforms to the specifications in Adelino et al. (2009a; 
2009b), Foote et al. (2009), and Piskorski et al. (2010). The regression results are presented with 
and without servicer fixed effects in Columns (2) and (3), respectively. The results show that 
without servicer fixed effects,  privately securitized loans have a 4.2  percentage point lower 
likelihood of renegotiation (a relative decline of 26%). With servicer fixed effects, the estimated 
effect increases to 4.4 percentage points and is strongly statistically significant. It remains robust, 
although servicer fixed effects have considerable  explanatory power, as evidenced by  the 
increase in the adjusted R
2 between Columns (2) and (3). 
 This category includes all three renegotiation practices: modification, repayment, and 
refinance. The first regression, depicted in Column (1), presents the results for the entire sample. 
The regression shows that portfolio-held loans have a 4.2 percentage point greater likelihood of 
renegotiation (or 28% in relative terms). This effect is very significant, both statistically and 
economically. 
While the earlier analysis removed the loans securitized by GSEs, one issue remains. 
There may be several loans on a bank’s portfolio that might be intended for sale to GSEs but 
remain on the lender’s book for some reason. Including these might bias our findings, as these 
bank-held loans intended for GSEs might be loans that are ex ante of better quality than privately 
                                                           
11 Since our sample ends in May 2009, the horizon for observations in December 2008 is five months instead of six 
months. The effect should be absorbed by the time dummies. 17 
 
securitized loans. Note that the earlier analysis implicitly assumed there were no such bank-held 
loans when we excluded all loans sold to GSEs. We now relax this assumption and explicitly 
exclude portfolio loans that have characteristics similar to those of GSE loans.  
In order to classify portfolio  loans as GSE-like or non-GSE-like, we follow the 
propensity score matching procedure of Keys et al. (2010b). In particular, we run a  probit 
regression on a sample of all securitized loans (private label and GSE), where the dependent 
variable is whether a loan is a GSE loan. The explanatory variables are FICO and LTV at 
origination (discretized into buckets), as well as indicators for year of origination, for whether a 
mortgage has adjustable interest rates, for non-owner occupancy, and for not fully documented 
loans (low or no documentation). Then, we predict the GSE dummy for each portfolio loan. We 
classify loans with a propensity score of 0.5 or more as GSE-like and the rest as non-GSE-like. 
The results of the restricted sample are presented in Column (4). The regression shows that the 
effect of securitization  is stronger for this subset of loans. Portfolio-held loans have a 5.9 
percentage point higher likelihood of renegotiation compared with private-label securitized loans 
(a 36% increase in relative terms).
12
The robustness of results to the inclusion of servicer fixed effects suggests that the 
differences in renegotiation rates cannot be explained solely by servicer-specific characteristics, 
such as capacity constraints. Instead, we observe that even within individual servicers, the choice 
 
                                                           
12 We reexamine the results with a subsample that ascertains further that we are not biasing our results by comparing 
portfolio loans that have loans intended for both  non-GSE and GSE with privately securitized loans. In an 
untabulated analysis, we test whether the difference between portfolio-held and private-label securitized loans exists 
for jumbo loans (loans with balance at origination above the GSE conforming loan limit); these loans—whether 
portfolio or privately securitized—are surely originated for the private market. Our results for the jumbo loan sample 
retain both the sign and the magnitude of the smaller renegotiations for securitized loans. 18 
 
to renegotiate rather than liquidate a delinquent loan is systematically related to whether this loan 
is owned directly by the servicers or is being serviced on behalf of external investors.   
The regressions also present evidence about other covariates affecting  renegotiations. 
Loans owed by borrowers who do not occupy the property are less likely to be renegotiated. 
Also, loans with less than fully documented income and with adjustable interest rates are less 
likely to be renegotiated. 
Next, we break  the  dependent variable (renegotiation dummy)  into  its components: 
dummies for modification, repayment, and refinancing. The results in Table 3, Panel A, Columns 
(5) to (8), show that modification, the largest class of renegotiations, is more likely to take place 
for  portfolio loans. When the entire sample is considered  (Column (5)), the effect of 
securitization is 4.7  percentage points  (47% in relative terms). However, this magnitude is 
misleading because modification is less common for GSE loans, as other renegotiation methods 
are preferred by the GSEs. When GSE loans are removed from the sample, the effect declines to 
2.4 or 4.3 percentage points (20% or 35% in relative terms), depending on whether servicer fixed 
effects are present (Columns (6) and (7)).  Once again, we note that controlling for servicer 
identity preserves the economic and statistical significance of the securitization effect on the 
likelihood of modification. When restricting the sample to non-GSE-like loans (Column (8)) the 
coefficient estimate increases to 5.9 percentage points (48% in relative terms). These results 
corroborate the findings of Piskorski et al. (2010) that renegotiations are less likely to take place 
for securitized loans sold to private investors relative to loans owned by the banks. 
When examining repayment plans (Panel B, Columns (1) to (4)) and refinancing (Panel 
B, Columns (5) to (8)), we find the effects of securitization are mixed. When servicer fixed 
effects are present, repayment plans are slightly less likely for portfolio loans while there is no 19 
 
observable difference in refinancing rates. When servicer fixed effects are omitted (Columns (2) 
and (6)), the portfolio-held loans are more likely to receive refinancing or repayment mitigations. 
This suggests that these two rare approaches to loss mitigation are likely to be concentrated at a 
handful of servicers with higher-than-average shares of portfolio loans. The positive coefficients 
on the GSE dummy in Columns (1) and (5) show that repayment plans and refinancing are the 
renegotiation methods that are favored by the GSE investors. 
Servicer fixed effects appear to explain a great deal of loss mitigation choices. This is not 
surprising, given the substantial heterogeneity in servicer mitigation tools summarized in Figure 
2. The regressions in Table 3 highlight the fact that servicer identity is an important determinant 
of  whether renegotiation takes place  in a multivariate framework.  This is evidenced by the 
comparison of adjusted R
2 in otherwise similar specifications with and without servicer fixed 
effects in Panels A and B. Adding servicer fixed effects increases the explanatory power of the 
regressions significantly (by more than 40%).  
 
3.4.  Robustness Tests 
Because  our results pertain to an ongoing academic  and  policy  debate, we provide 
additional robustness tests to underscore their validity. First, we verify that the effect is not 
mechanically driven by the horizon in which renegotiation is measured. These tests are 
motivated by the summary statistics in Table 2, where portfolio-held loans appear to be 
renegotiated faster than are securitized loans. While in Table 3, Panel A, the horizon is fixed at 
six months, in Panel C, we lengthen  the horizon to  9  and 12 months. The results across 
regressions  demonstrate  similar patterns to those in Panel A: renegotiations in general, and 20 
 
modifications specifically, are significantly more likely to take place for portfolio-held loans 
than for securitized loans, at a magnitude that increases with the horizon.  
Second, we examine the differential effect of securitization across quality classes  of 
loans. This test is useful in order to clarify whether we capture the effect of securitization, or 
potentially unobservable variables that are correlated with securitization status. More 
specifically, several studies have found that the quality of securitized loans is lower than that of 
loans kept on portfolio. (See evidence for higher default risk in non-agency securitized loans in 
Keys et al., 2010a, 2010b and Rajan, Seru, and Vig, 2008; and for higher prepayment risk in 
GSE/agency securitized loans in Agarwal, Chang, and Yavas, 2010). These studies argue that 
originators have soft information about mortgages, which they can exploit by securitizing poor-
quality  mortgages and keeping better ones.  We conjecture that information asymmetry is 
minimized for high-quality loans (fully documented loans with high FICO scores), and thus, 
there is little room for adverse selection in these mortgages. If our test shows that high-quality 
securitized loans also have lower renegotiation rates, then one could infer that securitization 
impediments rather than unobserved quality explains the lower rate of renegotiation. 
We categorize loans into three groups: low, medium, and high quality. Following earlier 
literature, we classify high-quality loans as loans with full documentation and FICO scores above 
680. Low-quality loans are defined as loans that have low documentation and FICO scores below 
620 at origination. The rest of the loans are deemed to be of medium quality. Table 3, Panel D, 
presents regressions for renegotiation and modification dummies for which the sample is split by 
loan quality. The results show that portfolio loans have consistently higher renegotiation and 
modification rates in each of the subsamples. In relative terms, the magnitude of the coefficient 
estimates is greatest in the subsample of highest quality loans. For those loans, being held in a 21 
 
portfolio  is associated with a 37% greater likelihood of renegotiation and a 75% greater 
likelihood of modification.  
These results suggest that the securitization bias is indeed  larger for high-quality 
borrowers. Overall, these findings support the view that securitization impedes renegotiation of 
loans due to factors such as servicers’ compensation, legal constraints, and uncertainty induced 
by servicing contracts and dispersion of ownership resulting from coordination problems among 
MBS investors. Notably, the coordination problem makes it hard not only to renegotiate debt 
contracts, but also to correct the servicer incentive structure and the ensuing agency problem (see 
also Mayer, 2010). 
It is also useful to note that we find higher renegotiation rates for portfolio-held loans 
even  in the low-quality  subsample. Interestingly, when Piskorski et al. (2010) examine the 
aggregate data,  they find no differences in renegotiation rates  between  portfolio-held and 
securitized loans for their low-quality sample. They attribute this to the fact that low-quality 
loans are likely to be the ones with most severe unobserved heterogeneity. When they do account 
for unobserved heterogeneity using a quasi-experiment of “early pay default” loans (which are 
all low-quality), they find that securitized loans are less likely to be renegotiated.   
Taken together with the above mentioned findings, our results on the low-quality sample 
are quite revealing. In particular, they suggest that our specification and controls (in particular, 
lender and servicer fixed effects) are accounting adequately for unobserved heterogeneity. We 
find this comforting; it suggests that, although we do not use a direct identification strategy, our 
stringent specification gives us results that are very much in line with those of a study that does 
use such a strategy. 22 
 
Finally, we examine whether the effects are consistent over time. We split the sample by 
the period in which mortgages became “in trouble,” 2008/Q1-Q2 vs. 2008/Q3-Q4, and rerun the 
main specifications. The results are presented in Table 3, Panel E. They show that the effects in 
both periods are statistically and economically significant.
13
Overall, these results uniformly show that renegotiations, and particularly modifications, 
are more likely to take place for portfolio-held rather than for securitized loans. These results 
support the claim that securitization is hampering renegotiation, potentially due to factors such as 
servicers’  financial incentives (separation of ownership and control), legal constraints,  and 
uncertainty induced by Pooling and Servicing Agreements and dispersed ownership of MBS 
securities, creating a coordination problem among investors.  
 
 
4.   Modification Terms and their Effect on the Likelihood of Redefault  
4.1.  Securitization and Modification Terms 
In the preceding analysis, ownership status appeared to be a prime factor in renegotiation 
decisions. In this section, we explore the modification terms that servicers offer on behalf of their 
clients (investors) and the terms that they implement for  mortgages they own.  Following 
modifications, loan terms primarily change along one of the following three dimensions: interest 
rate (typically reduced), mortgage balance (typically increased to reflect capitalization of unpaid 
interest; sometimes decreased following principal forgiveness), and mortgage term (typically 
extended). The Appendix in Adelino et al. (2009b) provides a discussion of modification terms. 
                                                           
13 As noted earlier, we impose no restriction on origination date in our sample. However, our results are robust to 
imposing a restriction that limits the sample to loans originated in a period that is closer to the crisis (e.g., 2005, 
2006, and 2007). 23 
 
Together, these three dimensions affect the monthly payment: decreases  in interest  rate, 
reductions in loan balance, and longer mortgage terms all translate to lower monthly payments.  
Table 1, Panel D, presents summary statistics for the types of modification terms used in 
different sub-samples. Interest rate reduction and freezing, the most common modifications (55% 
and 27% on average, respectively), are used primarily for private-label securitizations and GSE 
loans and, to a lesser extent, portfolio-held loans. Principal deferral and write-down actions are 
relatively rare (3%, and 1% on average, respectively) and used exclusively for portfolio-held 
loans. Term extensions are less common (15% on average), and are used primarily for GSE and 
portfolio loans and less for private-label loans. Capitalization of unpaid interest is common (38% 
on average) and is used primarily for GSE loans and private-label securitizations. 
In Table 4, Panel A, we systematically analyze how changes in the monthly payment and 
interest rate following modification are related to mortgage ownership status, as well as other 
controls. In Columns (1) to (3). we regress the change in monthly mortgage payment (measured 
as the percentage change relative to the original pre-delinquency payment) on a portfolio-held 
dummy. Column (1) restricts the sample to non-GSE loans and does not include servicer fixed 
effects. Column (2) uses the same sample, but adds servicer fixed effects. Column (3) removes 
portfolio-held loans that are GSE-like, using the propensity score technique described in Section 
3.3, thereby leaving only non-GSE-like mortgages in the sample. The results in Columns (1) and 
(2)  show that modified portfolio-held loans have smaller reductions in monthly  payments. 
Whereas modified loans, on average, realize a  9.2% decrease in monthly payment, among 
portfolio-held loans the reduction is 3.3 to 3.7 percentage points less. However, when the sample 
is restricted to non-GSE-like loans (Column (3)), the magnitude of the coefficient is cut in half 
and its statistical significance disappears (t = 1.6). 24 
 
When examining the association of the change in interest rates with the ownership status 
(Columns (4) to (6)), it appears that portfolio-held loans receive smaller interest rate concessions. 
Relative to securitized loans, portfolio-held loans receive interest rate concessions that are 46 to 
80 basis points lower, depending on the sample and control choices (24% to 48% in relative 
terms).  
Next, in Panel B, we examine changes in the other loan attributes (mortgage balance and 
mortgage term) with respect to ownership status. On average, modified loans experience a slight 
increase in mortgage balance (0.8%) as principal write-downs are much less frequent than 
capitalization of arrears (Table 1, Panel D). Relative to that benchmark, portfolio-held loans offer 
slightly more generous concessions, although their economic magnitude appears limited. 
Modified portfolio-held loans also offer somewhat shorter extensions of mortgage terms by (0.6 
months relative to the mean extension, which is approximately zero months (see Table 1, Panel 
C). We note, however, that in our sample period changes in balance and mortgage terms are 
relatively rare (Table 1, Panel D). 
It appears, therefore, that portfolio-held loans receive less generous  interest rate 
modification terms, relative to similar securitized loans. However, it is hard to estimate the 
impact of the differences on  borrowers across securitized and portfolio loans, since a particular 
loan could potentially receive multiple concessions. This is also complicated by the fact that 
some modifications, such as principal deferrals, occur only for bank-held loans.  
We further note that servicers have a strong influence on modification terms. This fact is 
demonstrated  in the univariate chart in Figure 3: each servicer appears to choose a unique 
combination of modification tools. Also in Table 4, Panels A and B, we note that servicer fixed 
effects have an important explanatory power over modification choices, especially in 25 
 
determining interest rates and mortgage terms (see differences in adjusted R
2 in regressions with 
and without servicer fixed effects). 
In Table 4, Panel C, we explore the changes in modification terms with respect to loan 
quality. Again, we split the non-GSE loans sample into three levels of loan quality according to 
the FICO scores and level of documentation. The results show that modified portfolio-held loans 
of medium-quality borrowers are those with the least favorable terms, relative to securitized 
loans; the changes in their monthly payments, interest rates, and mortgage terms offer the least 
amount of concessions. The only exception is the change in balance: mid-quality borrowers of 
portfolio-held loans receive the greatest principal forgiveness, although the economic magnitude, 
shown in Column (8), is very small at about 0.1%.  
 
4.2.  Redefault following Modification 
Our direct data on renegotiations also allow us to examine the efficiency of modifications 
across securitized and bank-held loans without any error. In this subsection, we explore this issue 
by examining the relation between the likelihood of redefault, ownership status, and modification 
terms. First, we note that redefault rates are very high for the population studied. In Table 1, 
Panel E, redefault rates are 40.6%, when redefault is defined as being 60+ days past due, and 
27.9% when redefault is defined as being 90+ days past due.
14
                                                           
14 Our redefault figures differ somewhat from the OCC and OTS (2009) reports, although the average level is 
similar. The average redefault rate in the OCC and OTS report from the second quarter of 2009 is 42%, while ours is 
40.6%. One potential reason for the difference is that we require borrowers to be current in the last quarter of 2007, 
while the OCC and OTS reports do not have such a requirement. 
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high for agency loans (49% are 60+ dpd within six months); portfolio-held loans have the lowest 
redefault rates (36% are 60+ dpd within six months). 
To explore the determinants of redefault, we turn to multivariate analysis. In Table 5, 
Panel A, Column (1), we regress an indicator for redefault within six months of modification on 
the portfolio-held dummy, in addition to the usual set of controls and fixed effects. This base 
regression shows that portfolio loans are 3.5 percentage points less likely to redefault in absolute 
terms (a relative improvement of 9.0% over the baseline). We note also that redefault is higher 
for borrowers who are non-occupants, for mortgages with less than full income documentation, 
and for adjustable interest rate mortgages.  
The regression also includes the effects of FICO, LTV, and origination year (untabulated 
for brevity) and is available upon request. We find that the redefault rate almost monotonically 
decreases with FICO and increases with LTV and the origination year. There is also a strong 
effect of the year of origination, with more recently originated loans experiencing much higher 
redefault rates.  
In  Columns  (2)  through  (5)  of Table 5, Panel A, we explore the relation between 
redefault and modification terms in conjunction with ownership status. Column (2) shows that 
the change in payment is a significant determinant of redefault. A 10% reduction in monthly 
payment is associated with a 4.3 percentage point lower likelihood of redefault (or  11% in 
relative terms). The strength of the estimated effect underscores the importance of mortgage 
affordability in achieving a successful modification. This finding supports the heavy emphasis on 
affordability in the federal HAMP efforts.    
The change in the monthly payment is an amalgam of changes in individual loan terms. 
The rest of the table thus analyzes individual modification components. In Column (3), we focus 27 
 
on the change in interest rates and an interaction with ownership status to the regression. The 
results show that the redefault rate is higher when the concession in interest rate is smaller (i.e., 
less negative).  A decrease in interest rate of 1 percentage point is associated with a  lower 
redefault rate of 5.4% (or 13.8% in relative terms). However, the sensitivity is slightly lower for 
portfolio-held mortgages. Column (4) shows that changes in balance have no material effect on 
the likelihood of redefault following modification. Column (5) shows that longer loan terms in 
modifications are associated with a higher likelihood of redefault. 
The results on modification terms and the redefault rates suggest that modifications of 
portfolio-held loans are more efficient. Specifically, conditional on modification, portfolio-held 
loans receive smaller concessions (Table 4, Panel A). Yet, their post-modification performance is 
stronger (Table 5, Column (1)). Taken together, it appears that servicers renegotiate their own 
loans more efficiently than they do loans owned by outside investors. 
Finally, Table 5, Panel B, explores the effects of ownership status on the redefault rate 
with respect to loan quality. At a first glance, the results in Columns (1) to (6) indicate that the 
redefault rate of high-quality loans is somewhat more sensitive to concessions in payment and 
interest rates. However, the sample size for these regressions is small enough to substantially 
weaken the statistical power of these tests. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
In this paper, we use precise data on loss mitigation actions by servicers and lenders in 
order to settle the debate about the role of institutions and,  in particular,  securitization in 
mortgage renegotiations. Our results show that securitization reduces the likelihood of 
renegotiation and increases the likelihood of foreclosure. The effect is large: securitized loans are 28 
 
4.2 to 5.9 percentage points less likely to be renegotiated (26% to 36% in relative terms) than 
portfolio loans. Importantly, the findings hold for high-quality loans (where information 
asymmetry is minimized), suggesting that they are not likely to be driven by unobservable 
characteristics that are correlated with ownership status.  
These results are consistent with the findings and empirical estimates of Piskorski et al. 
(2010). It is worth reiterating that our flexible specification and controls (in particular, lender and 
servicer fixed effects and zip code × calendar quarter fixed effects) are likely absorbing most of 
the underlying unobserved heterogeneity of loans. This is reinforced by the fact that our stringent 
specification gives us results that are in line with the Piskorski et al. (2010) study that uses an 
identification strategy based on early pay default loans to arrive at similar estimates. 
While the absolute levels of renegotiation rates may seem low, one needs to remember 
that there is no theoretical benchmark for the optimal number of loan renegotiations, given the 
unprecedented nature of the crisis (see Mayer, 2010, and Posner and Zingales, 2009). In the 
absence of such a benchmark, it is difficult to say whether the observed unconditional levels of 
renegotiations are too high or too low. This would potentially require a structural approach and is 
left for future research. 
In order to understand whether securitization has further effects on renegotiations, we 
explore the efficiency of modifications. The results suggest that, conditioned on modification, 
bank-held loans have a significantly lower redefault rate than similar securitized loans (about 
3.5% in absolute terms  and 9% in relative terms).  This increased efficiency of bank-held 
modifications is likely due to servicers having better information about borrowers whose loans 
they own directly rather than service on behalf of investors of a mortgage pool. 29 
 
This  paper adds to our understanding of the effects of securitization on the lending 
process. While securitization has a positive influence on certain aspects of credit markets--for 
example, by increasing the supply of credit (Mian and Sufi, 2009) and lowering the cost of 
capital  (Pennacchi,  1988;  Gorton and Pennacchi,  1995)—it also may give rise to various 
undesired outcomes. Mian and Sufi (2009) show that securitization-fueled credit expansion is 
associated with the  house price boom and consequent bust. Keys et al. (2010a) find that 
securitization leads to lenders shirking on borrower screening. Our paper extends this literature 
by showing directly for the first time that securitization results in lower renegotiation rates and—
under the assumption that bank-held loans are being renegotiated efficiently—less efficient 
renegotiation outcomes. Further, relative to the papers that discuss mitigation practices during 
the Great Depression (Rose, 2010; Ghent, 2010), our paper sheds light on policy issues that are 
most relevant to the current institutional setting. 
An important policy issue that arises from our paper is the relation between modification 
terms  and  redefault rates. We find  statistically significant and economically sizable results 
showing that redefault rates are higher when borrowers have lower credit quality and mortgages 
are less affordable. Specifically, redefault rates decrease with pre-modification FICO scores and 
with payment and interest rate concessions. Conversely, we find only a weak effect of leverage 
and balance increases/concessions on redefault. These results are consistent with the driving idea 
behind the Home Affordable Modifications Program (HAMP), which provides incentives for 
servicers and lenders to increase mortgage affordability as much as possible.  However, the 
benefits of this approach need to be contrasted with the cost to investors (or lenders) resulting 
from lower payments. We leave the study of the effectiveness of HAMP for future research. 30 
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Appendix 
To validate our sample, we replicate the results of two tests in Piskorski et al. (2010). We restrict 
the sample to have only portfolio loans and private-label securitizations. The sample tracks loans from 
October 2007 to May 2009. “In trouble” loans are loans that are 60+ days past due (dpd) or that entered 
loss mitigation programs. We require all “in trouble” loans to be current in the last quarter of 2007, hence 
this quarter is excluded from the analysis. Further, as we require a window in which we monitor loss 
mitigation actions, we restrict the sample to loans that became “in trouble” in 2008 only.  
We perform two sample validation regressions, which are presented in the table below (Table 
A1.).  First, we replicate the results in Table 3  of  Piskorski et al. (2010),  which shows  quarterly 
foreclosure logit regressions. The averaged coefficients from those regressions are presented. We estimate 
a similar logit regression where the dependent variable is whether a loan was liquidated within six months 
and present the marginal effect. Second, we run a regression that studies the determinants of 
renegotiations (“cure” regressions in Piskorski et al., 2010, Table 7, Panel A). Their original coefficient 
on the portfolio loan indicator is presented. While they use a Cox-proportional hazard model, we are 
restricted by the structure of the dataset and run an OLS regression. We transform Piskorski et al.’s 
(2010) coefficients so that they will be comparable to ours. Our coefficients from the OLS regression are 
presented in the last row of Table A1. All regressions include additional controls: FICO score, indicator 
for FICO score lower than 620, indicator for FICO score between 620 and 680, loan-to-value ratio, loan-
to-value ratio squared, origination loan amount, origination loan amount squared, indicator for fixed rate 
mortgage, indicator for 15-year term mortgage, indicator for 20-year term mortgage, mortgage age at 
delinquency, and zip code fixed effects interacted with calendar quarter fixed effects. 




Table A1. Validation of the Sample Used in the Study 
 
   
Regression Coefficient: I(portfolio loan)
Default regressions:
Piskorski et al. (2010), Table 3: Average coefficients (logit / marginal) -0.054***
(-10.57)
Our sample: Liquidated within 6 months (logit / marginal) -0.102***
(-17.23)
Cure / renegotiations regressions:
Piskorski et al. (2010), Table 7A: Original coefficients (Cox / Odds ratios) 1.129***
(17.15)
Piskorski et al. (2010), Table 7A: Transformed coefficients (Cox / Probabilities) 0.061***
(17.15)
Our sample: Renegotiated within 6 months (OLS) 0.047***
(19.25)34 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
The table presents descriptive statistics of the sample studied. The base sample is the universe of 
residential mortgages serviced by 10 largest banks in the U.S. (19 servicer entities). The sample tracks 
loan performance from October 2007 to May 2009. There is no restriction on the date of origination. “In 
trouble” loans are loans that are 60+ days past due (dpd) or entered loss mitigation programs. We require 
all “in trouble” loans to be current in the last quarter of 2007, hence this quarter is excluded from the 
analysis. Panel A presents descriptive summary statistics of loans that became “in trouble” in 2008, 
broken down by ownership status. Panel B lists the number of loans that were first in trouble, per calendar 
quarter.  Panel C presents summary statistics of the loans that were modified. Panel  D  presents a 
breakdown of the frequency of modification actions by calendar quarter and ownership status. Panel E 
shows a breakdown of frequency of redefault (i.e., default given modification) within six months per 
calendar quarter and ownership status. Redefault is defined as being 60+ dpd. As the regression tests in 
Tables 3 onwards examine loss mitigation practices within six months, Panels B, C, D, and E provide 
summary statistics for loans that became “in trouble” in 2008. 
 
Panel A: Breakdown of the Number of Loans in Trouble, per Calendar Quarter 
 
 
Panel B: Summary Statistics (Loans that Entered “in Trouble” Status in 2008) 
   
Quarter All Portfolio Private label GSE
2008Q1 265,453         119,682         87,659           58,112          
2008Q2 285,234         106,722         84,590           93,922          
2008Q3 256,323         101,877         61,551           92,895          
2008Q4 308,072         106,444         74,075           127,553        
2009Q1 215,056         72,430           46,818           95,808          
2009Q2 246,678         62,297           58,622           125,759        
Total 1,576,816      569,452         413,315         594,049        
# Borrowers in trouble
Variable Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
Resolution: Modification within 6 months 0.100 0.300 0.137 0.344 0.097 0.296 0.054 0.227
Resolution: Repayment within 6 months 0.026 0.160 0.023 0.149 0.016 0.127 0.038 0.192
Resolution: Refinance within 6 months 0.024 0.152 0.022 0.145 0.013 0.114 0.031 0.174
Resolution: Liquidation within 6 months 0.073 0.260 0.073 0.260 0.069 0.253 0.038 0.190
FICO at origination (%) 651.2 67.2 640.7 69.3 657.8 66.3 674.9 60.2
FICO at "in trouble" (%) 573.5 79.6 565.6 79.2 578.0 79.5 590.7 82.2
LTV at origination (%) 80.0 14.2 81.8 13.2 77.9 13.8 79.5 15.0
LTV at "in trouble" (%) 86.4 26.0 88.7 26.6 86.9 24.0 77.6 20.2
Portfolio-held dummy 0.390 0.488 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Securizer is Private-label 0.276 0.447 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Securitizer is GSE 0.334 0.472 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
Borrower is non-occupier 0.170 0.376 0.139 0.346 0.215 0.411 0.159 0.365
Low doc mortgage 0.048 0.213 0.053 0.224 0.046 0.209 0.039 0.194
Stated income mortgage 0.223 0.416 0.250 0.433 0.313 0.464 0.140 0.347
Mortgage is ARM 0.425 0.494 0.496 0.500 0.644 0.479 0.132 0.339
All (N = 1,115,044) Portfolio held (N = 569,452) Private label (N = 307,875) GSE (N = 372,482)35 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics (Cont.) 
Panel C: Summary Statistics for Modified Mortgages (Loans that Entered “in Trouble” 
Status in 2008) 
 
 
Panel D: Modification Type, by Mortgage Type and “In Trouble” Quarter  
 
 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Min p50 Max
FICO at "in trouble" 86471 570.8 75.2 343.0 560.0 822.0
LTV pre-modification 64514 89.3 25.2 30.0 85.0 199.6
Modification: Principal deferred 105760 0.030 0.169 0.0 0.0 1.0
Modification: Principal write-down 105760 0.007 0.083 0.0 0.0 1.0
Modification: Interest capitalized 105760 0.422 0.494 0.0 0.0 1.0
Modification: Interest rate reduced 105760 0.558 0.497 0.0 1.0 1.0
Modification: Interest rate frozen 105760 0.296 0.456 0.0 0.0 1.0
Modification: Term extended 105760 0.172 0.377 0.0 0.0 1.0
Modification: Combination 105760 0.626 0.484 0.0 1.0 1.0
Change in payment (%) 19506 -9.46 21.23 -76.9 -3.3 50.0
Change interest rates (bps) 105153 -152.3 205.7 -1075.0 -1.0 467.5
Change in balance (%) 105749 0.890 2.351 -1.6 0.0 15.0
Change in term (months) 88426 -0.065 2.721 -105.0 0.0 119.0
Redefault (60+ dpd) within 6 months (0/1) × 100 105760 40.56 49.10 0.0 0.0 100.0
Modification type 2008Q1 2008Q2 2008Q3 2008Q4
All Principal Deferred 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.02
Principal Writedown 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
Capitalization 0.28 0.31 0.47 0.48
Interest Rate Reduction 0.47 0.62 0.55 0.54
Interest Rate Frozen 0.16 0.26 0.33 0.32
Term Extended 0.11 0.11 0.20 0.20
Combination 0.58 0.62 0.68 0.61
GSE Principal Deferred 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Principal Writedown 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Capitalization 0.53 0.57 0.58 0.72
Interest Rate Reduction 0.49 0.57 0.58 0.76
Interest Rate Frozen 0.28 0.36 0.24 0.19
Term Extended 0.08 0.09 0.14 0.44
Combination 0.54 0.62 0.68 0.83
Portfolio Principal Deferred 0.01 0.04 0.13 0.04
Principal Writedown 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01
Capitalization 0.12 0.18 0.32 0.24
Interest Rate Reduction 0.25 0.36 0.40 0.31
Interest Rate Frozen 0.06 0.15 0.25 0.18
Term Extended 0.18 0.18 0.27 0.14
Combination 0.47 0.37 0.60 0.42
Private label Principal Deferred 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Principal Writedown 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Capitalization 0.32 0.34 0.69 0.79
Interest Rate Reduction 0.75 0.86 0.80 0.87
Interest Rate Frozen 0.21 0.33 0.51 0.65
Term Extended 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.16
Combination 0.74 0.83 0.80 0.86
"In Trouble" Quarter36 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics (Cont.) 
Panel E: Rates of Modification Redefault within 6 Months, by “In Trouble” Quarter 
 
   
"In Trouble"
quarter N All Portfolio Private label GSE All Portfolio Private label GSE
2008Q1 6,823         41.5 38.0 34.7 60.3 31.6 29.8 26.0 44.5
2008Q2 25,502       40.0 42.7 33.7 53.2 28.9 31.7 24.1 37.0
2008Q3 24,407       51.7 51.7 51.2 53.0 36.9 37.5 36.1 36.0
2008Q4 49,028       35.2 25.7 48.3 43.9 22.5 16.8 29.4 29.3
Total 105,760     40.6 36.2 43.2 49.1 27.9 25.6 28.8 33.6
% 60+ dpd % 90+ dpd37 
 
Table 2. Resolution Outcomes within a Given Time Frame, by Quarter 
The table presents the resolutions (or no action) of borrowers who became “in trouble” in a particular 
calendar quarter. The base sample is the universe of residential mortgages serviced by 10 largest banks in 
the U.S. (19 servicer entities). The sample tracks loan performance from October 2007 to May 2009. 
There is no restriction on the date of origination. “In trouble” loans are loans that are 60+ days past due 
(dpd) or entered loss mitigation programs. We require all “in trouble” loans to be current in the last 
quarter of 2007, hence this quarter is excluded from the analysis.  Panel A  presents loss mitigation 
resolutions within 3, 6, 9, 12 months for all loans (left four columns) and for loans that were securitized 
through GSEs (right four columns). Panel B presents similar outcomes for portfolio-held loans (left four 
columns) and for private-label securitizations (right four columns).  
Panel A: Loss Resolution Breakdown: All Mortgages, and GSEs 
 
 
Panel B: Loss Resolution Breakdown: Portfolio-Held Loans, and Private-Label 
Securitizations 
   
3 months 6 months 9 months 12 months 3 months 6 months 9 months 12 months
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Modification 0.066 0.100 0.124 0.149 0.027 0.054 0.086 0.109
Repayment 0.017 0.026 0.036 0.040 0.027 0.038 0.047 0.057
Refinancing 0.014 0.024 0.034 0.042 0.016 0.031 0.052 0.072
Total renegotiation 0.097 0.150 0.194 0.232 0.070 0.124 0.186 0.239
In foreclosure process 0.020 0.073 0.168 0.272 0.009 0.038 0.082 0.121
Liquidated 0.171 0.240 0.255 0.243 0.170 0.247 0.272 0.273
Total liquidation 0.191 0.313 0.423 0.515 0.179 0.285 0.355 0.394
No action 0.713 0.537 0.383 0.253 0.751 0.591 0.459 0.367
Sample: '08Q1-'09Q1 '08Q1-Q4 '08Q1-Q3 '08Q1-Q2 '08Q1-'09Q1 '08Q1-Q4 '08Q1-Q3 '08Q1-Q2
# Loans in trouble: 1237935 1115044 806976 550687 427092 372482 244929 152034
All mortgages GSEs
Loss resolution within… Loss resolution within…
3 months 6 months 9 months 12 months 3 months 6 months 9 months 12 months
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Modification 0.096 0.129 0.132 0.143 0.072 0.114 0.153 0.192
Repayment 0.013 0.024 0.037 0.040 0.009 0.015 0.021 0.026
Refinancing 0.013 0.023 0.029 0.037 0.010 0.016 0.021 0.023
Total renegotiation 0.123 0.176 0.199 0.219 0.092 0.144 0.195 0.241
In foreclosure process 0.022 0.091 0.197 0.336 0.029 0.090 0.218 0.322
Liquidated 0.149 0.204 0.234 0.228 0.205 0.282 0.266 0.236
Total liquidation 0.171 0.295 0.430 0.564 0.234 0.372 0.484 0.558
No action 0.706 0.529 0.371 0.217 0.674 0.484 0.321 0.200
Sample: '08Q1-'09Q1 '08Q1-Q4 '08Q1-Q3 '08Q1-Q2 '08Q1-'09Q1 '08Q1-Q4 '08Q1-Q3 '08Q1-Q2
# Loans in trouble: 475378 434687 328247 226404 335465 307875 233800 172249
Portfolio-held loans Private label securitization
Loss resolution within… Loss resolution within…38 
 
Table 3. Determinants of Renegotiation Methods 
The table presents regressions of renegotiation  type indicators on borrower, contract, and servicer 
information. The base sample is the universe of residential mortgages serviced by the 10 largest banks in 
the U.S. (19 servicer entities). The sample tracks loan performance from October 2007 to May 2009. 
There is no restriction on the date of origination. “In trouble” loans are loans that are 60+ days past due 
(dpd) or entered loss mitigation programs. We require all “in trouble” loans to be current in the last 
quarter of 2007, hence this quarter is excluded from the analysis. The sample analyzed here includes only 
loans that became “in trouble” in 2008 (we use the period until May 2009 to monitor renegotiation 
actions). Loans that became “in trouble” in December 2008 have only five months horizon. Panel A 
presents regressions of a renegotiation indicator (left four panels) and of modification indicator (right four 
columns) on determinants. Panel B presents regressions of repayment plan indicator (left four panels) and 
of refinancing indicator (right four columns) on determinants. Panel C presents robustness tests in which 
the horizon within which the loss mitigation resolution is measured is either nine or 12 months. Panel D 
presents regressions in which the sample is broken to low, medium, and high quality loans. The sample of 
Non-GSE loans consists of private-label securitizations and all portfolio loans. The sample of Non-GSE-
like loans is generated using a propensity score matching process. We regress GSE status indicator in a 
sample of all securitized loans (GSEs and private label) on loan and borrower characteristics at the time 
of origination.  The non-GSE-like sample includes all private-label loans and portfolio loans with a 
propensity score that is lower than 0.5. Low-quality loans are loans taken by borrowers with FICO score 
of 620 or lower and with income less than fully documented. High-quality loans are loans taken with 
FICO score of 680 or higher and with income that is fully documented. Medium-quality loans are all the 
rest. Panel E breaks the sample into quarters in which loans become “in trouble”. All regressions include 
fixed effects: in-trouble FICO score buckets, in-trouble LTV buckets, zip code interacted with calendar 
quarter, and origination year. Some regressions have servicer fixed effects, as indicated. t-statistics are 
presented in parentheses. Robust standard errors are clustered by servicer entity level. *, **, *** denote 
two-tailed significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Determinants of All Renegotiations and Modifications 
   
Sample: All Non-GSE Non-GSE Non-GSE-like All Non-GSE Non-GSE Non-GSE-like
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mean dependent variable: 0.149 0.162 0.162 0.162 0.100 0.122 0.122 0.122
Portfolio-held dummy 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.044*** 0.059*** 0.047*** 0.024*** 0.043*** 0.059***
(23.516) (24.348) (25.661) (23.395) (23.189) (9.384) (23.538) (28.169)
Securitizer is GSE 0.011*** -0.012***
(3.184) (-3.371)
Borrower is non-occupier -0.049*** -0.041*** -0.058*** -0.056*** -0.042*** -0.038*** -0.052*** -0.052***
(-40.421) (-26.864) (-39.082) (-36.139) (-38.813) (-25.753) (-37.968) (-36.754)
Low doc mortgage -0.018*** -0.023*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.025*** -0.013*** -0.027*** -0.026***
(-7.027) (-5.973) (-8.150) (-7.214) (-11.748) (-4.278) (-8.285) (-6.648)
Stated income mortgage -0.020*** 0.004** -0.029*** -0.031*** -0.016*** 0.018*** -0.022*** -0.024***
(-13.962) (2.353) (-19.109) (-19.472) (-11.352) (11.364) (-14.082) (-15.566)
Mortgage is ARM -0.080*** -0.079*** -0.093*** -0.115*** -0.082*** -0.070*** -0.095*** -0.117***
(-10.657) (-9.209) (-9.511) (-8.634) (-10.433) (-6.825) (-9.225) (-8.335)
Servicer entity FE Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 615536 431172 431172 335876 615536 431172 431172 335876
Adj. R
2 0.076 0.064 0.093 0.101 0.077 0.052 0.086 0.098
Fixed effects in all regressions: In trouble FICO, in trouble LTV, zip code × calendar quarter, origination year
Modification within 6 months (0/1) All renegotiations within 6 months (0/1)39 
 
Table 3. Determinants of Loss Mitigation Resolution (Cont.) 
Panel B: Determinants of All Renegotiations and Modifications 
 
 
Panel C: Determinants of Renegotiation Methods, by Horizon 
 
   
Sample: All Non-GSE Non-GSE Non-GSE-like All Non-GSE Non-GSE Non-GSE-like
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mean dependent variable: 0.026 0.020 0.020 0.017 0.024 0.020 0.020 0.018
Portfolio-held dummy -0.005*** 0.008*** -0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.010*** 0.001 0.001
(-9.346) (16.191) (-0.307) (-0.942) (0.674) (6.056) (1.426) (0.653)
Securitizer is GSE 0.018*** 0.004***
(23.998) (6.147)
Borrower is non-occupier -0.011*** -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.006*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(-20.779) (-13.464) (-15.345) (-11.127) (5.180) (3.860) (3.855) (3.694)
Low doc mortgage 0.010*** -0.004*** 0.001 -0.001 -0.002*** -0.006** -0.003** -0.002
(7.752) (-3.141) (1.007) (-0.722) (-2.726) (-2.334) (-2.307) (-1.489)
Stated income mortgage 0.001*** -0.004*** -0.000 -0.001* -0.005*** -0.010*** -0.007*** -0.006***
(2.963) (-7.383) (-0.847) (-1.724) (-9.106) (-6.290) (-10.905) (-10.287)
Mortgage is ARM -0.005*** -0.015*** -0.005*** -0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.009***
(-8.421) (-22.705) (-8.119) (-8.822) (10.162) (3.527) (8.948) (8.850)
Servicer entity FE Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 615536 431172 431172 335876 615536 431172 431172 335876
Adj. R
2 0.071 0.034 0.056 0.052 0.125 0.042 0.135 0.118
Fixed effects in all regressions: In trouble FICO, in trouble LTV, zip code × calendar quarter, origination year
Refinancing within 6 months (0/1) Repayment within 6 months (0/1)
9 months 12 months 9 months 12 months 9 months 12 months 9 months 12 months
Sample: Non-GSE Non-GSE Non-GSE Non-GSE Non-GSE Non-GSE Non-GSE Non-GSE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mean dependent variable: 0.196 0.088 0.141 0.066 0.031 0.010 0.026 0.012
Portfolio-held dummy 0.060*** 0.071*** 0.060*** 0.073*** -0.001 -0.002** 0.002 0.002
(25.243) (22.911) (21.830) (19.596) (-1.542) (-2.501) (1.511) (1.194)
Borrower is non-occupier -0.080*** -0.099*** -0.072*** -0.092*** -0.011*** -0.011*** 0.002*** 0.003***
(-40.425) (-40.521) (-39.031) (-39.534) (-14.826) (-13.062) (3.281) (3.667)
Low doc mortgage -0.037*** -0.047*** -0.034*** -0.044*** -0.001 0.001 -0.003* -0.005***
(-7.957) (-7.350) (-7.778) (-7.347) (-0.439) (0.350) (-1.668) (-2.627)
Stated income mortgage -0.032*** -0.038*** -0.022*** -0.027*** -0.001* -0.001 -0.008*** -0.010***
(-16.195) (-15.084) (-11.230) (-10.558) (-1.698) (-1.606) (-11.199) (-11.027)
Mortgage is ARM -0.128*** -0.144*** -0.129*** -0.148*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 0.010*** 0.012***
(-7.697) (-5.441) (-7.384) (-5.388) (-10.710) (-8.141) (9.136) (9.171)
Observations 325963 227075 325963 227075 325963 227075 325963 227075
Adj. R
2 0.123 0.154 0.114 0.142 0.080 0.113 0.138 0.187
Fixed effects in all regressions: In trouble FICO, in trouble LTV, zip code × calendar quarter, origination year, servicer entity
All renegotiations within… Modification within… Repayment within… Refinancing within…40 
 
Table 3. Determinants of Loss Mitigation Resolution (Cont.) 
Panel D: Determinants of Renegotiation Methods, by Loan Quality 
 
 
Panel E: Determinants of Renegotiation Methods, by Delinquency Calendar Quarter 
   
Sample (Quality): Low Mid High Low Mid High
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean dependent variable: 0.198 0.172 0.119 0.159 0.137 0.068
Portfolio-held dummy 0.050*** 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.050*** 0.040*** 0.051***
(3.381) (20.970) (15.721) (3.374) (17.757) (22.075)
Borrower is non-occupier -0.059*** -0.056*** -0.042*** -0.058*** -0.052*** -0.034***
(-5.062) (-30.502) (-16.619) (-5.423) (-29.750) (-17.073)
Low doc mortgage -0.015 -0.057*** -0.012 -0.054***
(-1.250) (-13.347) (-1.148) (-13.792)
Stated income mortgage -0.060*** -0.048***
(-32.108) (-27.200)
Mortgage is ARM -0.265*** -0.105*** -0.039*** -0.274*** -0.111*** -0.034***
(-8.904) (-9.497) (-10.673) (-9.317) (-9.564) (-9.506)
Observations 20434 310156 100582 20434 310156 100582
Adj. R
2 0.094 0.091 0.131 0.084 0.083 0.082
Fixed effects in all regressions: In trouble FICO, in trouble LTV, zip code × calendar quarter,
origination year, servicer entity
Modification within 6 months All renegotiations within 6 months
Became "in trouble":
Sample: All Non-GSE All Non-GSE All Non-GSE All Non-GSE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mean dependent variable: 0.132 0.131 0.166 0.169 0.087 0.099 0.112 0.132
Portfolio-held dummy 0.039*** 0.040*** 0.027*** 0.031*** 0.043*** 0.039*** 0.037*** 0.034***
(17.716) (19.540) (11.282) (11.898) (16.071) (18.546) (16.332) (13.913)
Securitizer is GSE 0.004 0.002 -0.011 -0.023***
(0.549) (0.624) (-1.637) (-10.056)
Borrower is non-occupier -0.039*** -0.043*** -0.059*** -0.076*** -0.034*** -0.039*** -0.048*** -0.067***
(-23.609) (-22.251) (-33.596) (-32.608) (-22.180) (-20.321) (-32.723) (-32.503)
Low doc mortgage -0.034*** -0.031*** 0.001 -0.018*** -0.029*** -0.027*** -0.016*** -0.020***
(-10.922) (-6.956) (0.168) (-3.411) (-9.823) (-6.654) (-5.291) (-4.160)
Stated income mortgage -0.017*** -0.024*** -0.023*** -0.035*** -0.011*** -0.016*** -0.022*** -0.031***
(-9.659) (-13.798) (-11.608) (-13.416) (-6.066) (-8.760) (-11.337) (-12.387)
Mortgage is ARM -0.072*** -0.085*** -0.081*** -0.094*** -0.077*** -0.088*** -0.081*** -0.096***
(-5.112) (-4.745) (-19.022) (-17.069) (-5.308) (-4.696) (-17.677) (-16.167)
Observations 301710 227075 313826 204097 301710 227075 313826 204097
Adj. R
2 0.089 0.103 0.109 0.133 0.072 0.085 0.114 0.127
Fixed effects in all regressions: In trouble FICO, in trouble LTV, zip code × calendar quarter, origination year, servicer entity
2008/Q1-Q2 2008/Q3-Q4
Modification within 6 months
2008/Q1-Q2 2008/Q3-Q4
All renegotiations within 6 months41 
 
Table 4. Determinants of Modification Terms 
The table presents regressions of modification terms on borrower, contract, and servicer information. The 
base sample is the universe of residential mortgages serviced by the 10 largest banks in the U.S. (19 
servicer entities). The sample tracks loan performance from October 2007 to May 2009. There is no 
restriction on the date of origination. “In trouble” loans are loans that are 60+ days past due (dpd) or 
entered loss mitigation programs. We require all “in trouble” loans to be current in the last quarter of 
2007, hence this quarter is excluded from the analysis. The sample analyzed here includes only loans that 
became “in trouble” in 2008 (we use the period until May 2009 to monitor renegotiation actions). Loans 
that became “in trouble” in December 2008 have only five months horizon. The regressions in the table 
include only loans that were modified and which servicers report their modification terms. The sample of 
Non-GSE loans consists of private-label securitizations and all portfolio loans. The sample of Non-GSE-
like loans is generated using a propensity score matching process. We regress GSE status indicator in a 
sample of all securitized loans (GSEs and private label) on loan and borrower characteristics at the time 
of origination.  The non-GSE-like sample includes all private-label loans and portfolio loans with a 
propensity score that is lower than 0.5. Low-quality loans are loans taken by borrowers with FICO score 
of 620 or lower and with income less than fully documented. High-quality loans are loans taken with 
FICO score of 680 or higher and with income that is fully documented. Medium-quality loans are all the 
rest. All regressions include fixed effects: in-trouble FICO score buckets, in-trouble LTV buckets, zip 
code interacted with calendar quarter, and origination year. Some regressions have servicer fixed effects, 
as indicated. t-statistics are presented in parentheses. Robust standard errors are clustered by servicer 
entity level. *, **, *** denote two-tailed significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Determinants of Modification Terms (Changes in Payment and Interest Rates) 
 
   
Sample: Non-GSE Non-GSE Non-GSE-like Non-GSE Non-GSE Non-GSE-like
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean dependent variable: -9.227 -9.227 -9.074 -168.578 -168.578 -193.338
Portfolio-held dummy 3.715*** 3.293*** 1.846 80.188*** 58.935*** 46.493***
(3.988) (3.456) (1.598) (26.901) (18.075) (11.432)
Borrower is non-occupier 2.153* 2.628** 2.598* 0.291 10.549** 12.532**
(1.687) (2.051) (1.881) (0.063) (2.312) (2.393)
Low doc mortgage -2.264 -2.301 -2.614 -27.321*** -11.219 -12.599
(-0.872) (-0.902) (-0.969) (-3.787) (-1.505) (-1.575)
Stated income mortgage -1.048 -1.657 -1.610 -37.364*** -27.005*** -30.009***
(-0.889) (-1.361) (-1.275) (-6.498) (-4.495) (-4.830)
Mortgage is ARM 3.147* 4.668** 8.702*** -0.125 61.952*** 85.089***
(1.791) (2.465) (3.791) (-0.012) (5.428) (6.277)
Servicer entity FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 9649 9649 9177 46813 46813 38041
Adj. R
2 0.140 0.147 0.180 0.194 0.238 0.202
Fixed effects in all regressions: In trouble FICO, in trouble LTV, zip code × calendar quarter, origination year
Change in …
interest rates (bps) payment (%)42 
 
Table 4. Determinants of Modification Terms (Cont.) 
Panel B: Determinants of Modification Terms (Changes in Balance and Mortgage Term) 
 
 
Panel C: Determinants of Modification Terms, per Loan Quality 
Sample: Non-GSE Non-GSE Non-GSE-like Non-GSE Non-GSE Non-GSE-like
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean dependent variable: 0.846 0.846 0.866 -0.085 -0.085 -0.092
Portfolio-held dummy -0.172*** -0.109*** -0.057 -0.351*** -0.602*** -0.560***
(-6.267) (-3.581) (-1.611) (-11.511) (-11.182) (-9.997)
Borrower is non-occupier 0.005 0.012 -0.009 -0.103*** -0.023 -0.041
(0.119) (0.290) (-0.182) (-3.275) (-0.742) (-1.363)
Low doc mortgage -0.021 -0.059 -0.042 -0.101*** -0.105*** -0.084***
(-0.367) (-0.999) (-0.677) (-3.067) (-3.206) (-2.751)
Stated income mortgage 0.029 0.082* 0.099** -0.119*** -0.189*** -0.150***
(0.609) (1.724) (2.031) (-5.961) (-6.459) (-5.597)
Mortgage is ARM -0.194*** -0.192*** -0.260*** -0.288*** -0.031 -0.023
(-3.278) (-2.777) (-3.028) (-11.569) (-1.343) (-1.093)
Servicer entity FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 47007 47007 38277 36078 36078 31206
Adj. R
2 0.159 0.166 0.169 0.246 0.289 0.281
Fixed effects in all regressions: In trouble FICO, in trouble LTV, zip code × calendar quarter, origination year
Change in …
term (months) balance (%)
Dependent:
Sample (Quality): Low Mid High Low Mid High Low Mid High Low Mid High
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Mean dependent variable: -12.5336 -9.535 -5.8911 -253.825 -169.107 -103.632 1.432024 0.848847 0.399897 -0.07101 -0.06344 -0.25122
Portfolio-held dummy 2.234 3.622*** -6.288 31.411* 63.559*** 33.038** 0.026 -0.107*** -0.215 -0.223** -0.606*** -0.368*
(0.369) (3.220) (-0.423) (1.876) (16.839) (2.229) (0.155) (-2.873) (-1.389) (-2.355) (-10.424) (-1.862)
Borrower is non-occupier -0.596 2.809** -0.245 17.515 6.849 -0.294 -0.473** 0.021 -0.015 0.060 -0.029 0.266
(-0.057) (2.021) (-0.015) (0.754) (1.258) (-0.016) (-2.022) (0.414) (-0.080) (0.649) (-0.836) (0.905)
Low doc mortgage -2.120 1.330 16.433 7.718 -0.423** -0.077 0.054 -0.191***
(-0.454) (0.304) (1.022) (0.658) (-2.365) (-0.878) (1.469) (-3.493)
Stated income mortgage -1.017 -16.096** 0.054 -0.244***
(-0.698) (-2.442) (1.189) (-6.376)
Mortgage is ARM 24.543** 5.637*** -3.717 223.218***68.462*** 6.266 -0.776** -0.185** -0.024 0.051 -0.009 -0.319*
(2.442) (2.592) (-0.226) (5.178) (5.815) (0.347) (-2.207) (-2.545) (-0.141) (0.838) (-0.354) (-1.699)
Observations 808 7660 1181 4396 36717 5700 4435 36853 5719 3519 28710 3849
Adj R
2 0.255 0.149 -0.042 0.242 0.215 0.185 0.104 0.149 0.112 0.599 0.231 0.488
Fixed effects in all regressions: In trouble FICO, in trouble LTV, zip code × calendar quarter, origination year, servicer entity
Change in Payment (%) Change in Rate (bps) Change in Balance (%) Change in Term (months)43 
 
Table 5. Redefault following Modification 
The table presents regressions of redefault indicator (becoming 60+ dpd within 6 months) on modification 
terms, in addition to borrower, contract, and servicer information. The base sample is the universe of 
residential mortgages serviced by the 10 largest banks in the U.S. (19 servicer entities). The sample tracks 
loan performance from October 2007 to May 2009. There is no restriction on the date of origination. “In 
trouble” loans are loans that are 60+ days past due (dpd) or entered loss mitigation programs. We require 
all “in trouble” loans to be current in the last quarter of 2007, hence this quarter is excluded from the 
analysis. The sample analyzed here includes only loans that became “in trouble” in 2008 (we use the 
period until May 2009 to monitor renegotiation actions). Loans that became “in trouble” in December 
2008 have only five months horizon. The sample includes only loans that are private-label securitizations 
or portfolio-held loans. Low-quality loans are loans taken by borrowers with FICO score of 620 or lower 
and with income less than fully documented. High-quality loans are loans taken with FICO score of 680 
or higher and with income that is fully documented. Medium-quality loans are all the rest. All regressions 
include fixed effects: in-trouble FICO score buckets, in-trouble LTV buckets, zip code interacted with 
calendar quarter, and origination year. Some regressions have servicer fixed effects, as indicated. t-
statistics are presented in parentheses. Robust standard errors are clustered by servicer entity level. *, **, 
*** denote two-tailed significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Determinants of Redefault following Modification 
   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mean dependent variable: 39.0 39.0 39.0 39.0 39.0
Change in payment (%) 0.430***
(8.332)
   × Portfolio-held dummy -0.031
(-0.400)
Change in rate (bps) 0.054***
(20.625)
   × Portfolio-held dummy -0.030***
(-8.832)
Change in balance (%) -0.349
(-1.554)
   × Portfolio-held dummy -0.208
(-0.649)
Change in term (months) 3.991**
(2.306)
   × Portfolio-held dummy 2.629
(1.415)
Portfolio-held dummy -3.503*** 0.376 -12.378*** -3.400*** -5.458***
(-4.150) (0.167) (-12.227) (-4.111) (-4.718)
Borrower is non-occupier 3.339*** 2.458 3.303*** 3.348*** 3.315***
(3.392) (0.888) (3.559) (3.397) (2.878)
Low doc mortgage 1.063 5.052 2.184 1.060 2.173
(0.748) (1.098) (1.549) (0.749) (1.474)
Stated income mortgage 2.408** 3.314 4.503*** 2.394*** 1.977*
(2.553) (1.418) (5.562) (2.582) (1.752)
Mortgage is ARM 11.572*** 4.354 11.048*** 11.524*** 15.860***
(9.142) (1.623) (11.992) (9.285) (9.988)
Observations 47017 9649 46813 47007 36078
Adj R
2 0.112 0.160 0.144 0.113 0.149
Fixed effects in all regressions: In trouble FICO, in trouble LTV, 
zip code × calendar quarter, origination year, servicer entity
Redefault (60+ dpd) within 6 months (0/1) × 10044 
 
Table 5. Redefault following Modification (Cont.) 
Panel B: Determinants of Redefault following Modification, per Loan Quality 
 
   
X =
Sample (Quality): Low Mid High Low Mid High Low Mid High Low Mid High
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Mean dependent variable: 45.4 38.6 37.1 45.4 38.6 37.1 45.4 38.6 37.1 45.4 38.6 37.1
Change in X 0.221 0.437*** 0.913 0.044*** 0.054*** 0.056*** -0.033 -0.317 -0.561 9.971*** 6.461*** 0.242
(1.041) (7.391) (1.278) (7.101) (19.488) (3.760) (-0.074) (-1.121) (-0.491) (3.087) (5.909) (0.077)
   × Portfolio-held dummy 0.036 -0.017 -0.339 -0.014 -0.030*** -0.030 -1.240 -0.159 0.112 -2.167 1.708 4.540
(0.068) (-0.183) (-0.341) (-1.407) (-8.257) (-1.390) (-1.328) (-0.390) (0.062) (-0.568) (1.485) (1.252)
Portfolio-held dummy 11.859 0.647 17.876 -5.655 -12.940*** -9.565* 4.498 -3.768*** -3.265 0.190 -5.458*** -2.735
(0.579) (0.241) (0.601) (-1.304) (-11.162) (-1.935) (1.165) (-3.874) (-0.805) (0.052) (-4.045) (-0.498)
Borrower is non-occupier 2.127 3.250 15.469 1.431 5.066*** 1.434 2.012 4.970*** 1.035 0.417 5.159*** -2.496
(0.104) (0.994) (0.457) (0.276) (3.996) (0.302) (0.378) (3.696) (0.221) (0.080) (3.184) (-0.384)
Low doc mortgage 3.549 1.367 3.911 -0.078 -0.543 4.189 1.288
(0.327) (0.188) (1.034) (-0.042) (-0.289) (1.234) (0.650)
Stated income mortgage 1.300 0.576 -4.483 -1.125 -0.268
(0.400) (0.551) (-1.301) (-0.966) (-0.185)
Mortgage is ARM 12.896 6.697** -1.071 16.199* 14.327***17.609*** 26.946** 15.184***17.195*** 30.735***18.378*** 15.982**
(0.397) (1.978) (-0.031) (1.706) (12.467) (3.667) (2.547) (10.247) (3.468) (2.920) (9.373) (2.176)
Observations 808 7660 1181 4396 36717 5700 4435 36853 5719 3519 28710 3849
Adj R
2 0.161 0.181 0.134 0.188 0.151 0.163 0.156 0.119 0.141 0.192 0.161 0.178
Fixed effects in all regressions: In trouble FICO, in trouble LTV, zip code × calendar quarter, origination year, servicer entity
Payment (%) Rate (bps) Balance (%) Term (months)
Dependent variable: Redefault (60+ dpd) within 6 months (0/1) × 10045 
 
Figure 1. Loss Mitigation Resolutions 
Initial Performance Status:


























   46 
 




The chart presents a breakdown of loss mitigation resolution methods by servicer entity. The 
sample tracks loans from October 2007 to May 2009. “In trouble” loans are loans that are 60+ 
days past due (dpd) or entered loss mitigation programs. We require all “in trouble” loans to be 
current in the last quarter of 2007, hence this quarter is excluded from the analysis. The sample 
analyzed here includes only loans that became “in trouble” in 2008 (we use the period until May 





































The chart shows the fraction of modified mortgages in which servicer entities applied a specific 
modification method. The sample tracks loans from October 2007 to May 2009. “In trouble” 
loans are loans that are 60+ days past due (dpd) or entered loss mitigation programs. We require 
all “in trouble” loans to be current in the last quarter of 2007, hence this quarter is excluded from 
the analysis. The sample analyzed here includes only loans that became “in trouble” in 2008 (we 
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